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I. Introduction 
The cornerstone of market socialism, according to Lange, Lerner, and Taylor, is 
the public ownership of the means of production and the state is regarded as the 
default representative of the ‘public.’ Associated with this basic feature, the market 
socialism literature emphasizes the role of the state to govern markets in resource 
allocation. The most important coordination mechanisms that a market socialist 
economy relies on are the administrative mechanism (or “bureaucratic coordination 
mechanism” (Kornai, 2001)) and the market mechanism. In sharp contrast to the 
practice of capitalist economies in the world, the market socialism literature does not 
discuss the functions of financial markets. Market socialist thinkers (e.g. Lange, 
Lerner, and Taylor) did not mention stock markets although they all discussed product 
and labor markets in detail.  Moreover, the role of law and legal institutions is absent 
in that literature as well.  
A major reason for the sharp contrast in the different roles of financial markets 
and law in capitalist economies and in the market socialist economy literature is 
related to the ownership structures in the two models. Individuals in a capitalist 
economy not only trade products and labor but also trade financial assets of means of 
production. Consistently private ownership is the dominant ownership structure in a 
capitalist economy and financial markets are an essential part of a capitalist economy 
where ownership rights of means of production are traded. Associated with this, legal 
mechanism is the key to protect private property rights and to govern financial 
markets for exchanging financial assets. However, in principle, the dominant property 
right structure is state ownership in a market socialist economy. Consequently, there 
is no need for financial markets as an institution for exchanges of productive assets. 
Moreover, as the state has obligation to protect the state properties and employs 
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administrative power to enforce contracts, legal institutions designed to protect 
private property rights become redundant, or may be even in conflict with the will of 
the state bureaucracy.  
Finally, the absence of stock markets in market socialism literature is also due to 
the fact that at the times of the market socialist thinkers (e.g. Lange, Taylor, Lerner) 
there was no sufficient intellectual understanding of the function of stock markets and 
law as an essential mechanism for corporate governance. It was not generally 
recognized that there existed severe incentive problems in state-owned firms, which 
were caused by the separation of ownership and control similar to that in publicly 
traded firms in capitalist economies. In fact, even at his late years, Lange still did not 
realize the importance of incentive problems associated with state-owned firms, 
although these issues were raised by von Hayek to challenge the market socialist idea.  
Many of the later leading proponents of market socialism did not realize the central 
importance of incentive issue either (see a survey by Bergson, 1967).  Thus law and 
finance as mechanisms of solving those problems were unsurprisingly absent in the 
market socialism literature. 
Chinese government has claimed that its goal is to reform the Chinese 
economy into a market socialist economy.  Although the coexistence of a large state 
sector and the increasingly dominant market forces makes the Chinese economic 
system apparently look similar to the feature of market socialism in the literature, a 
basic fact may distinguish China from the literature: China has developed equity 
markets over the past decade at a large scale. However, in view of the fact that the 
Chinese stock markets are dominated by state-owned companies and are governed by 
administrative mechanism, one may argue that these two features seem fit well with 
the market socialism model.  
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Though China’s equity market under administrative governance bears 
resemblance to a market socialism model, we argue that the Chinese financial market 
development is actually inconsistent with a market socialist model.  The dominant 
state ownership of listed companies is only a transitory phenomenon in China’s 
economic transition. Listed state-owned companies are issuing more and more 
equities to individual investors, introducing into state-controlled companies more 
private shareholders. More importantly, a general consensus or expectation among 
scholars and practitioners has been formed that as the Chinese securities markets 
further develop, the state-owned shares will become ultimately tradable, which allows 
private investors to acquire state-owned shares. Eventually the state will not hold 
controlling blocks for many of the listed firms and a substantial proportion of listed 
firms will not be state owned firms any more.  This implies a changing ownership 
pattern from the dominance of state ownership to that of private ownership. Thus it 
contradicts with the basic principle of the market socialism. 
Then how well does the Chinese financial market development fit with a 
capitalist model?  Extensive evidence has been reported on how markets work in 
capitalist economies. The literature shows that financial development determines 
economic development in market economies (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; King and 
Levin, 1993).  From this perspective, it seems that the fast financial development and 
economic development in China fit with that pattern well. However, on the other hand 
the literature also shows that the quality of law affects financial market development. 
In that aspect, it does not seem that China fits with the capitalist model. In the 
literature the quality of law is measured by formal minority shareholder rights (La 
Porta et al., 1997; La Porta et al., 1998), by formal mandatory disclosure rules and 
their enforcement (La Porta, et al. 2002), by the effectiveness of legal institutions 
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(Pistor et al. 2000), and also by the legacy of legal development in countries being 
studied (Berkowitz et al. 2003). Deterrence failure and regulatory failure are 
identified for understanding how law and the related governance operate as important 
determinants for financial market development in capitalist economies (Pistor and Xu, 
2003; Xu and Pistor, 2004). In contrast to the above facts, it has been noticed that 
China has poor formal legal institutions (Allen et al. 2004; Ohnesorg, 2003; Pistor and 
Xu, 2005).  China had a very weak legal basis when it began to develop financial 
markets in the early 1990s. Moreover, courts were weak, and have in fact played 
almost no role in enforcing investor rights to this day. Firm specific information has 
been highly distorted thereby undermining the effectiveness of newly established 
regulatory agents. Thus, if to follow the capitalist law and finance model, i.e. to rely 
on legal governance, the Chinese attempts to jump start securities markets would 
suffer greatly from the severe deterrence and regulatory failure problems.  
Explaining the Chinese financial governance approach, Pistor and Xu (2005) 
argue that China has deployed an administrative governance structure in their 
financial markets, which has mitigated deterrence and regulatory failure.  Comparing 
this Chinese practice to the capitalist model, we argue that the Chinese financial 
market governance does not fit with a ‘typical’ capitalist model.  The anchor of the 
Chinese financial market governance institutions was the so-called quota system. This 
system effectively enlisted pre-existing institutions of state and party governance in 
the selection of companies for listing on a stock exchange. It was based on the 
existing regional competition, and it created further competition among regions for 
access to centrally controlled equity market entry. It tapped into the insider 
knowledge about firms by state bureaucrats at companies and/or local governments, 
which was not accessible by other means. Our evidence suggests that the quota 
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system creates incentives for regional governments to select better firms. Specifically, 
the allocation of quotas to each region was determined by the earlier aggregate 
performance of the listed firms from the region.  This implies that regional 
governments selecting better performing firms at IPOs in pervious periods had been 
rewarded by gaining more quotas later; and vice versa.  Moreover, our evidence from 
the cross-region financial development shows that the regional financial development 
(in equity markets) in China is positively correlated with levels of regional economic 
development and internationalization. That is, although different from the capitalist 
model of financial market governance, the cross-region financial development under 
this Chinese structure is consistent with the trend of capitalist economies discovered 
in the cross-country studies (e.g. Claessens, et al. 2002).   
Finally, we conclude the paper by arguing that although the initial stage of 
jumping start stock markets in China is a success, this administrative governance may 
not be a long run solution for China’s financial development. Thus even purely from 
governance structure point of view this cannot be regarded as a workable model of 
market socialism.  Our evidence shows that the Chinese governance structure is 
failing to monitor companies once they are listed on the market. This indicates that 
this Chinese administrative governance is not a stable system.  Moreover, this 
administrative governance structure does not work effectively for non-state owned 
firms, which is a necessary condition in a capitalist model of financial market. 
Therefore, it is neither a stable market socialist model nor a stable capitalist system.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II explains briefly the 
Chinese non-capitalistic financial market governance institution. Section III provides 
evidence how this institution works. Section IV demonstrates that the Chinese 
regional financial development seems consistent with the pattern discovered from 
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capitalist economies. Finally, Section V concludes that although initially successful 
the Chinese financial market governance structure is losing its effectiveness. Thus, it 
is only a transitional phenomenon.  
 
II.  Non-capitalistic Governance of Financial Markets 
Compared with a capitalistic financial market governance model, China is 
very weak in public law enforcement record and has no record on private law 
enforcement. However, almost all standard measures for stock market performance 
suggest that China is performing better than most other transition economies, which 
are all adopting a capitalist model.  Particularly, China has outperformed all other 
transition economies on what might be the most important aspect – the ability of listed 
firms to raise funds. China has the most liquid of all stock markets, with only 
Hungary coming close.  Companies in Central and Eastern Europe have only rarely 
used IPOs to raise capital except Poland with 47 IPOs between 1994 and 2001. By 
contrast, in the same period of time, there were 873 IPOs in China.  Between 1998 
and 2001 alone China witnessed 414 IPOs with firms raising a total of 508.6 billion 
RMB (or 61.6 billion US$). No other transition economy is even close (Pistor and Xu, 
2005).  
Non-capitalistic governance or a weak legal institution on the one hand and a 
strong performance on jumping start stock market on the other hand make China a 
puzzling case. We argue that China’s financial market development was based on an 
administrative governance regime, which partially substituted formal legal institutions 
and prevented the worst enforcement failures. The core of it was the so-called quota 
system. The quota system was officially in place from 1993 and 2000. De facto it 
governed financial markets up to the end of 2002 or further.  
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The quota system functioned to promote decentralized information collection 
in an environment that was plagued with information problems far exceeding those 
commonly known in developed financial markets. Investors as well as regulators face 
substantial obstacles to obtaining access to corporate information, particularly for 
companies that launch their initial public share offering (IPO), as little information 
about them is known to the market. In Western markets, mandatory disclosure rules 
seek to reduce information problems. Conditions for the efficacy of mandatory 
disclosure rules, however, were not present in China. Under centrally planned system 
state owned companies operated according to accounting standards that contained 
little information relevant for evaluating their market values. Even when books were 
converted by applying international accounting standards, the conversion process was 
subject to a substantial margin of error (Fang, 1995). Professional market watchdogs 
capable of and willing to verify accounts were only beginning to emerge and the 
creation of an effective governance structure for these intermediaries lagged even 
further behind. Absent effective governance, accountants, auditors, and securities 
analysts often participated in fraud (Green, 2003). Against this background, disclosure 
rules could not be credibly enforced and therefore were ineffective in resolving the 
severe information problem investors and regulators faced. Instead, mechanisms were 
needed to induce insiders to reveal critical information that could be used for a 
meaningful selection of companies for public offerings.  
Under the particular Chinese conditions, the quota system created an incentive 
structure that helped solve informational problems at the IPO stage. Regional 
competition has been essential in various reforms in China. That competition among 
regions has developed vested interests for regional government officials in their 
regions’ economic performance, which became a critical factor for their own career 
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advancement (Qian and Xu, 1993; Maskin, Qian and Xu, 2000). By rewarding better 
regional corporate performance with more quotas in share issuance for that region in 
subsequent periods, the quota system encouraged the local governments to bring the 
better performing firms in their regions to be listed on the stock market. Moreover, the 
quota system is believed to be efficiency-enhancing because allowing regions with 
better corporate performance to issue more shares is largely equivalent to allowing 
regions with better economic performance to raise more equity finance. From the 
restoration of stock markets in the early 1990s until now, the performance of regional 
companies on the two major stock exchanges has been directly linked to the region’s 
economic performance. Two factors contribute to this link. First, the political-
consideration-motivated sources of funding for corporations have diminished. The 
central credit allocations were curtailed and firms are less dependent on regional 
budgets. The allocation of funds has been more and more driven by efficiency 
considerations. Second, more sources of non-state-administered corporate finance 
came into being. Listed companies gained access to equity finance where private 
investors play an important role; firms also obtain bank financing from other regions.    
  
III. Quota as an Incentive System to Regional Governments: Evidence 
Quotas have been a basic feature of state and regional economic management 
in China prior to and during the transition period, in particular for allocating critical 
resources among regions1. The annual quota for each region was established in an 
intense bargaining between regional governments and relevant central agencies (i.e. 
the ministry for energy, or the central bank). The primary purpose for extending the 
quota system to China’s fledging stock markets was to maintain control over its size 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this paper, we use the term “region” to refer to administrative sub-division at the 
provincial level. 
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and stability (Fang, 1995). In its practical application, however, it is related to the 
existing regional competition; and it created further regional competition for the 
allocation of quotas, which in turn fostered a selection and information collection 
process that facilitated market development during the crucial start-up period.  
Each year the PBoC established the amount of shares firms were allowed to 
issue to the public. In 1993, the first year when the quota system was in full operation, 
5 billion shares were made available at the national level. Individual regions received 
quotas in the amount of 50 million to 500 million shares (Fang, 1995). Governments 
at the provincial level negotiated the size of the quota for that region with the 
respective provincial branch of the CSRC. When they had reached an agreement, the 
request together with information about the companies the province wanted to bring 
to the market was submitted to the center. The CSRC decided over the allocation of 
quotas to different provinces and ministries on the basis of the information it had 
received and within the quantity constraint established by the PBoC. As we will 
further argue below, this promoted competition among the regions and induced them 
to collect and reveal critical information about the relative quality of companies 
operating in each region.   
After the regional quota had been allocated, the selected companies had to go 
through an individual approval process. At this stage the applicants were vetted for 
compliance with the formal merit and disclosure requirements set forth in relevant 
statutes and regulations (Fang, 1995). 
The quota system de facto served as an important administrative governance 
device, which consisted of incentives for decentralized information collection.  That 
limited serious fraud at the stage of IPO. Specifically, the quota system imposed a 
‘quantity constraint’ to provinces. With competition among provinces, this created 
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incentives for local governments to select companies that would enhance the 
province’s future access to quotas.  By involving regional governments as the owners 
of regional state-owned firms the quota system also tapped into insiders’ knowledge 
and thereby reduced the information problem. 
If the operation of the quota system provides incentives, we should observe 
that future allocations of quotas to a region are related to past performance of 
companies from that region. That is, quota allocations to regions should be positively 
correlated with past performances of listed companies from corresponding regions.  
Quota allocated to each region is the total number of shares allowed to be 
issued from the region.  However, time series information about the size of the quota 
allocated to different regions is not publicly available. The proxy for the size of a 
region’s quota we use is the number of shares issued by firms from different 
provinces.2  We use the rate of increase in the number of shares issued to control for 
the variation in the size of regions. To account for the time lag between the allocation 
of shares to a province and the actual public offering, we use changes over a three 
year period. Specifically, the rate of increase in quota for region i at period t is 
measured as [y(i, t)- y(i, t-3)]/ y(i, t), where y(i, t)  is Total Shares of Region i in Year 
t where t ranges from 1995 to 2003 and i covers 31 Chinese provinces and provincial 
level municipalities3.  To link quota to regional performance of listed companies, we 
employ several measures for the performance of listed companies as independent 
variables, which encompass indicators such as total and tradable market 
capitalization, price/book-value ratio, turnover ratio, and net profits, respectively. We 
                                                 
2 In reality there is usually a time lag between quota allocation and the listing of a firm. 
3 If we stretch the beginning year of the sample to 1994 or 1993, the calculation of quota requires data 
on shares issued in year 1991 or 1990. However, very few provinces were allowed to put firms onto 
stock exchanges at that time so that we cannot conduct meaningful statistical analysis.  
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also use the rate of increase in these variables over a three-year period in our 
regression analysis. 
Specifically, Performance Indicators for Listed Companies from Region i in 
period t includes the three-year growth rates of market capitalization of total tradable 
shares of listed companies, of the market capitalization of tradable shares, of the P/E 
ratio, of the P/B ratio, of the turnover ratio, of the net profits and of the earnings per 
share. In regressions, the performance indices are lagged by one year, that is, [y(i, t-
1)- y(i, t-4)]/ y(i, t-4) , where y(i, t-1) and y(I, t-4) are Region i’s Performance in Year 
t-1 and t-4 respectively. To save space, we report only two scattered plots to illustrate 
our regression results whereas the details of regression models and tables are omitted.   
Figure 1 presents the scatterplot of the relationship between the earlier 
performance indicators and the subsequent quota allocation on the basis of the panel 
data of the two variables over the period 1995-2003. We can see that the earlier 
performance indicators such as the growth in market capitalization of tradable shares 
and that in net profits show strong positive correlations with the later quota allocation. 
Similar positive correlations can also be observed between later quota allocation and 
earlier performance measured by other aspects of market or accounting performance.  
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Figure 1 
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Next, we construct performance indices of listed companies from region i at 
period t. We group individual performance indicators into two broad categories. One 
group is based on stock market performance, while the other group is built upon the 
accounting data. We thus construct three categories of indices in our two regression 
models: Overall Performance Index, Market Performance Index and Accounting 
Performance Index. Market Performance Index is calculated as the simple average of 
the three-year growth rates in regional aggregate levels of market capitalization of 
total shares of listed companies, the market capitalization of tradable shares, the P/E 
ratio, the P/B ratio, and the turnover for each region. Accounting Performance Index 
is the simple average of the three-year growth rates in regional average levels of net 
profits and earnings per share. Overall Performance Index is constructed as the simple 
average of the three-year growth rates in market capitalization of listed companies, 
the market capitalization of tradable shares, the P/E ratio, the P/B ratio, the turnover, 
the net profits and the earnings per share for each region. In regressions, the 
performance indices are lagged by one year, that is, (Regional Performance in Year t-
1 – Regional Performance in Year t-4)/Regional Performance in Year t-4. 
From Figure 2, we can see that earlier Overall Performance and Market 
Performance indices exhibit fairly strong positive correlation with the later quota 
allocations based on the panel data over the period 1995-2003. The earlier Accounting 
Performance Index also moves positively with the later quota allocations, though the 
correlation is weaker.   
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Figure 2 
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Although strong correlations between previous performance and later quota 
allocations suggest that performances determine quota allocation, statistically it does 
not completely rule out a reverse causality.  To address this issue, we conduct some 
cross-section regressions based on the early stage of the stock market development 
and quota allocation. The idea of this exercise is that when the stock market was 
initially established, it is much harder to imagine that initial quota allocation had 
major impacts on corporate performance.   
The quota system was initiated in 1993, and only in 1994 and 1995 most of the 
Chinese provinces (29 provinces) began to have corporations listed in Shanghai or 
Shenzhen stock exchanges. The number of shares issued in these initial years reflects 
the initial allocation of quota for almost all provinces. It provides a starting point for 
us to analyse how the allocation of quotas in subsequent periods responds to regional 
variation in corporate performance. In other words, only until 1994 and 1995, most 
provinces successfully put their firms onto the stock market. Then they ran a horse 
race to compete for quota allocation by presenting their better performing firms.   
Focusing on the early stage of stock market launch, we examine how the quota 
allocation in the period 1995-98 responds to the changes in the provincial corporate 
performance indicators. Figure 3 demonstrates cross section regressions, where the 
dependent variable is the three-year growth rate in the total number of shares from 
1995 to 1998. The independent variables are growth rates in the performance 
indicators, such as growth rates of tradable market capitalization or of net profits over 
the period 1994-1997. We see that all the individual performance indicators show a 
clear positive correlation with the subsequent growth in quota allocation.  
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Figure 3 
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In Figure 4, we present the relationship between the three aggregate 
performance indices and the later quota allocation based on the period 1995-98. 
Clearly, there is strong positive correlation between the two variables based on the 
cross-section regression. 
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Figure 4 
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V. Regional Financial Development: Evidence 
Evidence from the preceding section suggests that a non-capitalist governance 
approach seems working in Chinese financial market development, i.e. the quota 
system was a de facto incentive scheme to motivate regional governments to select 
better firms at IPO stages.  That is because regions with better-performed firms in 
stock markets are more likely to acquire more quota allocation in the future. The 
cross-country study from capitalist economies shows that there is a strong positive 
correlation between financial development and economic development. It is 
interesting to compare the Chinese cross-region financial/economic development with 
the pattern discovered from the capitalist world.  Figure 5 plots regional (provincial) 
per capita GDP against regional market capitalization over GDP ratio in 2002. It 
suggests that similar to cross country results for capitalist economies, the Chinese 
regional distributions of the two indicators also show a strong positive correlation. 
Figure 5 
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To gain a further insight into the relationship between geographical 
distribution of quota and economic development, we group all provinces and 
province-level municipalities into three broad regions --- the east coast region, the 
central region, and the western region. The general consensus is that the socio-
economic development level is the highest in the east coast region and declines 
gradually in going to the central and western regions respectively. In Table 1, we 
present some summary statistics for the financial market development in the three 
broad regions in two years --- 1994 and 2002. The indicators of financial development 
that we look at comprise market capitalization/GDP, tradable A-share market 
value/GDP, and aggregate market turnover ratio. Consistent with our expectation, the 
east coast region clearly enjoys a substantially higher level of financial development, 
registering a larger value of these three indicators than the central and western regions 
in the year 1994. Though the gap shrinks in 2002, the east coast region still claims the 
highest value of these three indicators of financial market development.  However, 
there is no clear difference in the level of financial development between the central 
and the western regions. This is probably because the east coast region leads the 
nation in stock market development and corporatization, while both the central and 
western regions are lagging behind and lying at similar levels.    
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Table 1 
This table shows the summary statistics of the ratio of market capitalization over GDP, the ratio of tradable A-share market value over GDP, and Aggregate 
market turnover ratio at two points in time (year 1994 and year 2002). The series are averages across provinces that are grouped into three regions --- the east 
coast region, the central region, and the western region. East coast region includes Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan, Hebei, Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shandong, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, and Zhejiang. Provinces such as Anhui, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jilin, and Shanxi are classified into the central 
region. The western region encompasses Chongqing, Gansu, Guangxi, Guizhou, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Xizang (Tibet), 
Xinjiang, and Yunnan. (Guangxi and Inner Mongolia are centrally located, but they participate in western development scheme.)   
 
   1994      2002    
  Market Cap / GDP    Market Cap / GDP   
 No.  Mean Median Max Min Std.Dev. No.Obs Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. 
 Obs.            
East Coast Region 11 0.16 0.021 1.14 0.0098 0.33 11 0.54 0.27 1.82 0.14 0.57 
Middle Region 8 0.029 0.021 0.098 0.0059 0.029 8 0.23 0.23 0.36 0.13 0.065 
Western Region 9 0.021 0.016 0.043 0.0070 0.013 12 0.34 0.30 0.71 0.16 0.16 
             
  Tradable A-Share Market Value/ GDP  Tradable A-Share Market Value/ GDP 
 No. Mean Median Max Min Std.Dev. No.Obs Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. 
 Obs.            
East Coast Region 11 0.031 0.0080 0.15 0.0017 0.047 11 0.14 0.091 0.34 0.044 0.024 
Middle Region 8 0.0066 0.0063 0.012 0.0023 0.0042 8 0.082 0.082 0.13 0.043 0.064 
Western Region 9 0.0067 0.0044 0.015 0.0021 0.0052 12 0.13 0.11 0.27 0.053 0.064 
             
  Aggregate Market Turnover Ratio (%)  Aggregate Market Turnover Ratio (%) 
 No. Mean Median Max Min Std.Dev. No.Obs Mean Median Max Min Std. Dev. 
 Obs.            
East Coast Region 11 20156.45 8263.84 115231.80 2651.04 33116.25 11 13627.51 11928.5 35178.16 3769.87 10294.74 
Middle Region 8 3414.79 2350.12 8034.55 618.03 2677.17 8 6804.95 6799.63 11333.79 2866.84 2355.79 
Western Region 10 3604.70 1657.50 14839.64 848.64 4361.98 12 4466.93 3336.35 13177.62 1930.96 3059.26 
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V Conclusion 
Our analysis of the quota system as an alternative governance device to allow 
ex ante screening in an environment that is hampered by lack of information and 
effective ex post law enforcement does not account for how markets were governed in 
the post-listing stage. It is becoming increasingly clear that the quota system is ill-
suited for dealing with problems of continuous disclosure or market manipulation. 
Moreover, the CSRC is not well placed to use law enforcement mechanisms against 
companies that have the entire backing from the regional authorities, because even 
though it is a central government agency, it is not formally superior to provincial 
governments. In the public offering stage, this was less of a problem, because the 
CSRC could play regions off against each other and thus leverage on the fact that 
regions were competing with each other. However, these governance devices are 
significantly weaker in the post-listing world.  
Violations by firms that have been already listed have become rampant in 
recent years. Summarizing data collected by the CSRC, Table 2 indicates that more 
than 90% of all violations by firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
were related to violation of continuous, that is post-listing, disclosure, of which 64% 
concerned violations of ad hoc disclosure requirements.  
 
Table 2Violations on Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges (1993-2001) 
 
 
 
Type of 
Information 
Type of Disclosure Violation # of 
violations 
Share 
as % of 
Total 
Share 
as % of 
Total 
IPO False Information Disclosure re 
listing 
9 3.6 Violation of 
disclosure 
requirements 
at public 
offering 
Stocks 
distributed to 
employees 
False Information Disclosure re 
employee held shares 
1 0.4 
 
 
 
 
4 
Violation of 
continuous  
Periodic 
Disclosure  
Non-disclosure in Annual Report  
34 
 
13.6 
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False Disclosure in Annual 
Report 
 
14 
 
5.6 
(Annual 
Report) 
Other Annual Report Disclosure 
Violations 
 
24 
 
9.6 
 
 
 
28.80 
Non-disclosure in Midyear 
Report 
 
3 
 
1.2 
Periodic 
Disclosure 
(Midyear 
Report) 
False Disclosure in Midyear 
Report  
 
7 
 
2.8 
 
 
 
4 
M&A Information Disclosure   
2 
 
0.8 
Non-disclosure of Major 
Investments 
 
3 
 
1.2 
Non-disclosure of Guarantees  
12 
 
4.8 
Non-disclosure of Major 
Transactions 
 
13 
 
5.2 
Non-Disclosure of Major 
Litigations 
 
15 
 
6 
Non-Disclosure of Connected 
(Related) Transactions 
 
18 
 
7.2 
Non-disclosure of Predicted 
Losses  
 
31 
 
12.4 
Unapproved Interim Disclosures  
3 
 
1.2 
False Interim Information 
Disclosure 
 
1 
 
0.4 
disclosure 
requirements 
Interim 
Information 
Disclosure 
Failure to Make Interim 
Disclosure 
 
49 
 
19.6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58.8 
Others Other Reasons Other Reasons  11 4.4 4.40 
 Total  250 100 100 
Source: HE Jia et al., Chinese and Foreign Disclosure Systems Comparison and Their 
Effectiveness [Zhong-wai Xinxi Pilu Zhidu jiqi Shiji Xiaoguo Bijiao Yanjou], Table 3-5, Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange Research Institute, 2002.   
The ineffectiveness of the governance mechanisms based on ex ante screening 
for stemming violations that occur in the post listing stage is corroborated by data on 
the regional distribution of violations (Table 3). Interestingly, the best performing 
regions, Northern China, Eastern China, and Southern China, are on opposite ends of 
the spectrum, suggesting that the post – listing violations are independent of economic 
performance.  The number of listed firms from Northern and Eastern China accounted 
for more than 56% of all listed firms in the two stock exchanges, whereas their 
violations amounted to less than 31% of all violations. This seems to suggest that 
better performance is associated with greater compliance, or less cheating. By 
contrast, the data on Southern China suggest the opposite. Only 15% of listed firms 
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are located in the Southern region of China, but they accounted for 28% of all 
violations – the worst region in the nation.4 
Table 3. Regional Distribution of Listed Companies Penalized For Disclosure 
Violations  
Regions and provinces within 
them 
# Of Firms 
Fined 
% Of All 
Firms Being 
Fined 
Number of Firms Listed 
as % of National Total 
Violation 
Indicator 
Northeast  
Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning 
31 14.22 10.51 +35.30 
Northern China 
Beijing, Tianjin, Inner 
Mongolia, Hebei, Shanxi, 
Shandong 
22 10.09 17.98 -43.87 
Eastern China 
Shanghai, Anhui, Zheijiang, 
Fujian, Jiangsu, Jianxi 
47 21.56 28.58 -24.56 
Southern China 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan 
62 28.44 15.38 +84.92 
Central China 
Henan, Hunan, Hubei 
25 11.47 9.99 +14.79 
Northwest 
Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, 
Qinghai, Xingjiang  
6 2.75 6.69 -58.86 
Southwest 
Changqing, Yunnan, 
Guizhou, Sichuan, Tibet  
25 11.47 10.86 +5.86 
TOTAL 218 100 100 0 
Source: HE Jia et al., Chinese and Foreign Disclosure Systems Comparison and Their Effectiveness 
[Zhong-wai Xinxi Pilu Zhidu jiqi Shiji Xiaoguo Bijiao Yanjou], Table 3-11, Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
Research Institute, 2002 
 
Our paper demonstrates that although the initial stage of jumping start stock 
markets in China can be seen as a success, this administrative governance may not be 
a long run solution for China’s financial development. Thus even purely from 
governance structure point of view this cannot be regarded as a workable model of 
market socialism.  Our evidence shows that the Chinese governance structure is 
failing to monitor companies once they are listed on the market. Therefore the 
Chinese administrative governance will not be a stable system.  Moreover, this admin 
                                                 
4 The fact that the Northern, Eastern, and Southern China are the best economic performing regions is 
supported by other sources of data, such as Chinese Statistic Yearbook (all the years since the mid 
1990s). The fact that the Northern and Eastern China are among regions that followed law best (or least 
corrupted), and Southern China is among regions that followed law worst (or most corrupted) is also 
supported by other sources of data, such as Xie and Lu (2003). 
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governance structure does not work effectively for non-state owned firms. Therefore, 
it is neither a stable market socialist model nor a stable capitalist system.   
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